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1. Introduction
In his  new book,  Epistemic Angst (2015),  Duncan Pritchard provides  us  a  diagnosis of  radical
skepticism as relying on two independent philosophical theses, namely, the universality of rational
evaluation thesis and the insularity of reasons thesis. To properly understand Pritchard’s response to
skepticism,  it  is  crucial  to  identify  the  philosophical  character  of  these  two  theses.  They  are
supposed to be the outcome of fault philosophical theory about our ordinary epistemic concepts.
This  means  that,  in  his  view,  the  skeptical  problem  is  not  a  genuine  paradox.  Thus,  in  a
Wittgensteinian spirit, a good diagnosis of the origins of such fault philosophical theory may be
enough to clarify that these theses have no basis, freeing us then from the attraction of radical
skepticism. Pritchard calls this strategy an undercutting response to radical skepticism. 
In line with this dual origin of radical skepticism, Pritchard proposes that we should distinguish
between two radical skeptical paradoxes. One appeals to the universality of the rational evaluation
thesis,  the closure-based radical skeptical  paradox,  and a second turns on the insularity  of the
reasons thesis,  the underdetermination-based radical skeptical paradox. Pritchard sets himself the
task of showing why those two theses are based on faulty theoretical grounds. The first thesis trades
on commitments that are not justified once one has a correct picture of how the rational evaluation
of beliefs works. Based on Wittgenstein’s comments about the structure of rational evaluation, “the
picture that emerges is thus one in which all rational evaluation is essentially local.” (Pritchard
2015, 66) In other words, every rational evaluation presupposes some fundamental commitments
that are themselves immune to rational evaluation. In the literature, these fundamental commitments
are called hinge propositions. Pritchard contends that these commitments are not beliefs and, as we
will see, this is essential to finding our way out of the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. As to
the insularity of reason thesis, which underpins the second paradox, it receives support from an
unjustified  prior  commitment  to  the  so-called  new  evil  demon  intuition.  Pritchard  appeals  to
epistemological disjunctivism in order to undermine this intuition. By combining Wittgensteinian
hinge epistemology with epistemological disjunctivism, Pritchard aims to provide an undercutting
response to both radical skeptical paradoxes. 
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Pritchard’s book is thoughtful, illuminating in the way he organizes the debate and pleasurable to
read.  This  is  a  critical  commentary.  In  Section  2,  I  present  the  closure-based radical  skeptical
paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in
Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of
hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of
these commitments. 
2. The Closure-based Radical Skeptical Paradox and the Universality of Rational Evaluation
Thesis
The closure-based formulation of the radical skeptical paradox is constituted by three apparently
intuitive  claims  that  are  inconsistent  when  taken  together.  In  his  book,  Pritchard  presents  and
discusses many versions of this paradox. I will start with the version that has an internalist view of
knowledge as its target, since versions that trade on externalist views of knowledge simply seem to
beg the question against the skeptic. We thus have the following closure-based paradox: 
(S21) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. 
(S22) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV,
then one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S33) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E. (Pritchard 2015, p. 22) 
“E” in this formulation stands for a proposition that expresses perceptual knowledge such as “I am
presently sitting at my desk” (Pritchard 2015, p. 12). The first claim expresses the intuition that we
cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. The third
claim conveys the intuition that we have perceptual knowledge at least of some propositions. The
second claim is a bridging principle that establishes the clash between the first and the third claims.
It is motivated by a version of the closure principle tailored for rationally grounded knowledge.
Pritchard calls it The ClosureRK Principle, which is stated as follows: 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from
p  that  q,  thereby  forming  a  belief  that  q  on  this  basis  while  retaining  her
rationally  grounded  knowledge  that  p,  then  S  has  rationally  grounded
knowledge that q. (Pritchard 2015, p. 23)
2
The idea behind the closure principle is simply that rationally grounded knowledge is preserved
across competent deductions. competent deductions must preserve knowledge. It’s a very appealing
and intuitive  principle.  Thus,  although the  closure  principle  may be  restricted  to  avoid  radical
skepticism, as is suggested by Dretske, a solution to the paradox that preserves this principle in its
universal  form seems  to  be  preferable,  all  other  things  being  equal.  The  problem here  is  that
commitment  to  the  closure  principle  makes  it  very  easy  to  extend  the  scope  of  one’s  rational
evaluations, so that in the end there is no limit on what can be rationally evaluated. To take one of
Pritchard’s  examples,  suppose “one has  rationally  grounded knowledge that  Napoleon won the
Battle  of  Austerlitz  in  1805”  (Pritchard  2015,  p.  72).  Based  on  this  knowledge,  one  may
competently deduce that the universe did not come into existence five minutes ago. By the closure
principle, one would then acquire rationally grounded knowledge that the universe did not come
into existence five minutes ago, which is the denial of a radical skeptical hypothesis. Conversely, if
one does not know that this hypothesis is false, then one also does not know that Napoleon won the
Battle of Austerlitz in 1805. If the scope of rational evaluation may be extended in this way, then in
principle any propositional commitment could be rationally evaluated. This is what is claimed by
the universality of rational evaluation thesis. 
3. The Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation
According to Pritchard’s reading of Wittgenstein’s account of the structure of rational evaluation,
there is a limit to what can be rationally evaluated because rational evaluation itself occurs on a
backdrop of  commitments  that  are  not  open to  rational  evaluation.  These commitments,  which
henceforth will  be called  hinge commitments,  structure and make possible a process of rational
evaluation. They are, therefore, presuppositions of one or another procedure of rational evaluation.
Moore’s claim that he knows that he has two hands or that the world did not come into existence
five minutes ago is mistaken because by saying that he knows these things he implies that they
could be justified, but they can’t. There is nothing more certain and immune from doubt than, for
instance, the commitment that I have two hands. If I were to justify this commitment by looking at
my hands, it’s not clear what I should conclude if I do not see them. As Wittgenstein clearly puts it:
“For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be
tested by what?” (OC, §125) Commitments that structure a procedure of rational evaluation are the
things we take as the most certain and, therefore, cannot themselves be justified. If these comments
about the structure of rational evaluation are correct, then the  universality of rational evaluation
thesis is false. Rational evaluation is inherently local, “in that it takes place relative to fundamental
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commitments that are themselves immune to rational evaluation, but that need to be in place in
order for a rational evaluation to occur” (Pritchard 2015, p. 66). 
The next step is to show how this new picture of the structure of rational evaluation may help to
dissolve  the  closure-based  radical  skeptical  paradox.  After  all,  acknowledging  that  hinge
commitments  cannot  be  rationally  evaluated  is  at  first  sight  water  to  the  mill  of  the  skeptic.
Something needs to be said about why we take these commitments as certain. At this juncture, it is
crucial to discuss the nature of hinge commitments. In this regard, Pritchard considers many ways
of  construing  hinge  commitments:  the  externalist  reading,  the  entitlement  reading,  the
nonpropositional reading, and the nonbelief reading, the last of which is his own take on the issue. I
will focus on Pritchard’s reading and the nonpropositional reading. I start now with the latter. 
3.1. The Nonpropositional Reading 
The  nonpropositional  reading  of  hinge  commitments  essentially  asserts  that  they  are  not
propositional  attitudes  of  any  sort,  but  they  are  instead  ways  of  acting.  So,  although  hinge
commitments apparently have the form of empirical  propositions,  they do not express any fact
about the world. Pritchard thinks this is one of the best readings of Wittgenstein’s remarks in  On
Certainty (Pritchard 2015, p. 86). It makes sense of passages such as this one: 
204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but
the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a
kind of  seeing on our part;  it  is  our  acting,  which lies at  the bottom of the
language-game. (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 25).
Since hinge commitments are not propositions, they are not in the market for knowledge. This
means that they cannot be the target of inferences based on the closure principle. Assuming for now
that “I am not a BIV” is a hinge commitment, the point is that a bridging principle such as “If one
cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, then one cannot have rationally
grounded knowledge that E” should be resisted, not because we have restricted the scope of the
closure principle but because this is an inappropriate attempt to apply the closure principle to what
is  not  a  proposition  at  all.  Without  that  bridging principle,  the  closure-based radical  skeptical
paradox does not arise in the first place. 
4
Pritchard has two reservations regarding the nonpropositional reading. The first is that it needs to
appeal to a theory of meaning that explains why it is not possible to adopt a propositional attitude
toward hinge  propositions.  In  a  dispute  with the  skeptic,  this  is  a  very contentious  move.  The
second reservation is that it seems that it would always be possible to convert a way of acting to a
corresponding propositional attitude. One may reason from one’s rationally grounded knowledge
that Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz occurred in 1805 to the entailment that the world did not come
into  existence  five  minutes  ago.  What  was just  a  way of  acting,  namely,  taking some data  as
evidence for a certain claim, is now converted into a commitment to a proposition. 
 
3.2. The Nonbelief Reading
The  nonbelief  reading  argues  that  hinge  commitments  are  propositional  attitudes  distinct  from
beliefs. Like beliefs, these commitments are incompatible with agnosticism about the truth of the
target  proposition  (Pritchard  2015,  101).  Unlike  beliefs,  hinge  commitments  are  taken  as  true
despite  the  fact  that  there  is  no rational  basis  for  believing them. Hinge commitments  are  not
responsive  to  rational  considerations.  Because  of  that,  hinge  commitments  cannot  be rationally
grounded,  therefore,  they  are  not  in  the  market  for  knowledge.  So,  like  the  nonpropositional
reading, the nonbelief reading also predicts that it’s not possible to obtain knowledge of a hinge
commitment by competently deducing it from a piece of rationally grounded knowledge. However,
unlike  the  nonpropositional  reading,  the  nonbelief  reading  allows  for  the  possibility  of  a  such
deduction. Thus, according to the nonbelief reading, it is possible to competently deduce but not to
know  a  hinge  commitment.  When  one  competently  deduces  a  hinge  proposition  from  one’s
rationally grounded knowledge, what one acquires is not a belief but a special type of propositional
attitude. Therefore, closureRK principle can be preserved in its unrestricted form since it’s tailored
exclusively to beliefs (Pritchard 2015, 92). The unknowability of hinge propositions, even when
they  are  competently  deduced  from  rationally  grounded  knowledge,  is  not  a  violation  of  the
closureRK principle. 
Now, something needs to be said about what hinge propositions express. According to Pritchard,  a
hinge proposition  excludes a possibility of error. Hinge commitments together codify “the entirely
general hinge commitment that one is not radically and fundamentally mistaken in one’s beliefs.
Call this commitment the  über hinge commitment, and call the proposition endorsed by the über
hinge commitment the über hinge proposition” (Pritchard 2015, p. 95).
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4. Criticisms
In what follows, I will put forward two critiques about Pritchard’s response to the radical skeptic
closure based paradox. First, I will raise some doubts about his criticism of the nonpropositional
reading and about the propositional attitude envisaged by the nonbelief reading. Then I will sketch a
version of the nonpropositional reading that, I think, may put pressure on Pritchard’s view. 
4.1. Some Concerns about the Nonbelief Attitude Regarding Hinge Commitments
It is not clear that the nonpropositional reading needs to appeal to a contentious theory of meaning
to sustain the idea that hinge commitments are not propositions. The claim that hinge commitments
must have a role different than that fulfilled by empirical propositions may be substantiated  on the
oddness of uttering them in normal contexts. We do not need an explicit criterion of meaningfulness
to identify senseless assertions. In fact, it’s the other way around; whatever this criterion may be, it
must be acknowledged that in normal contexts assertions such as “I have two hands” and “The
world didn’t come into existence five minutes ago” are senseless. These are paradigmatic cases of
senseless assertions. In his defense, Pritchard claims that one might have a propositional attitude
toward  a  hinge  commitment  because  one  could  competently  deduce  it  from  one’s  rationally
grounded knowledge. He also says that acknowledging the oddness of uttering a hinge commitment
is, in principle, compatible with having a propositional attitude toward that commitment. As he puts
it,  “If the kind of model of meaningfulness being canvassed in support of the nonpropositional
reading were feasible, then such an assertion would indeed be senseless. But would it follow that
the subject didn’t have the propositional attitude in question?” (Pritchard 2015, 87). However, given
the undeniable oddness  of  asserting  a  hinge  commitment,  it’s  Pritchard’s  burden to  defend the
possibility of the propositional attitude he envisages. A defender of the nonpropositional reading,
without having to assume any theory of meaning, could simply deny that one can competently
deduce a hinge commitment from one’s rationally grounded knowledge. It’s as odd to deduce a
hinge  commitment  as  to  assert  it.  Besides,  what  kind  of  deduction  can  start  with  a  piece  of
rationally grounded knowledge and, therefore, a belief, and end with a propositional attitude that is
not a belief? Faulty philosophical theory may lead one to think that there is a real possibility here.
But prima facie there is none. 
A related complain is whether the propositional attitude Pritchard thinks one could have toward
hinge commitments is a real possibility. In Chapter Four, he gives a general characterization of this
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kind of attitude: “it involves a commitment to the target proposition that is incompatible with an
attitude of agnosticism about its truth” (Pritchard 2015, 101). At the same time, this attitude is not in
principle responsive to rational evaluation. Let’s call this attitude the  nonbelieving propositional
attitude. But then, given these two constraints, is there any reason to think that this is a possible and
stable propositional attitude? In fact, the skepticism Pritchard himself raised against rational trust
could now be raised as validly against the nonbelieving propositional attitude: 
Is that it is hard to see how an agent who is fully aware that she has no rational
basis for regarding the target proposition as true could be anything but agnostic
about that proposition. After all, isn’t the recognition that this rational basis is
lacking simply tantamount to being agnostic about the truth of this proposition?
How could it be otherwise? (Pritchard 2015, 82)
He cannot say that one regards the target proposition as true because of prudential or practical
reasons, since he has already acknowledged that this kind of attitude is compatible with agnosticism
about  the truth of the target  proposition (Pritchard 2015, 81).  The point  is  that  a  propositional
attitude that aims at the truth of propositions must be governed by some kind of normativity. It has
to be possible to assess how well a subject fulfills the aim of the nonbelieving propositional attitude.
What kind of normativity structures this attitude? It is neither prudential nor moral normativity. Is it
epistemic? If so, how could it not also be responsive to epistemic reasons? The situation is even
more delicate because the normativity at issue is not only the normativity of the attitude of aiming
at  the  truth  but  also  the  normativity  of  the  attitude  of  aiming  at  the  truth  without  any  doubt.
Pritchard says that the nonbelieving propositional attitude is not responsive to reasons because it is
visceral, animal (2015, p. 106) and not optional (2015, p. 109). But how is this supposed to explain
the characteristic normativity of the nonbelieving propositional attitude? The visceral and animal
aspects seem to point not to epistemic normativity but to a practical one or to none at all. It doesn’t
seem  that  Pritchard  has  provided  enough  evidence  to  show  that  the  propositional  attitude  he
envisages is coherent or possible. 
4.2. The Ability Reading
In what follows, I will put forward a proposal on how to construe hinge commitments. However,
I’m not concerned whether it captures what Wittgenstein meant to articulate in On Certainty. I want
to say something along the lines of the nonpropositional reading without committing myself to the
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idea that there is no meaningful way to convey hinge commitments in propositions. However, even
if one finds a way to convey one’s hinge commitments, maybe in the form of rules or normative
propositions,  these  propositions  cannot  assume the  role  played by hinge  commitments.  This  is
because propositions cannot capture the practical dimension involved in hinge commitments. In
short,  my  proposal  is  that  hinge  commitments  are  ways  of  acting  entrenched  in  abilities  that
structure procedures of rational evaluation. In a Rylean spirit, I submit that our rational evaluations
and,  therefore,  our  rationally  grounded  knowledge  are  underpinned  by  abilities  and  skills  that
cannot themselves be reduced to propositional attitudes. I call this proposal the ability reading. 
Thus, I agree with the nonpropositional reading in that hinge commitments are ways of acting. For
instance,  the  hinge  commitment  that  the  world  did  not  come  into  existence  five  minutes  ago
corresponds, in part,  to one’s disposition to take certain documents, pictures, and testimonies as
evidence that a certain event, Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz, happened more than two hundred
years ago. Of course, this hinge commitment does not correspond to that particular way of acting
alone but to a wide set of similar ways of acting founded on abilities of historical inquiry. These
ways of acting are acquired by learning how to gather and assess historical evidence. They are
associated with a special sort of ability to inquire. Propositional perceptual knowledge is also to be
understood as grounded on an assessment ability, we learn to take, in the appropriate conditions,
certain perceptual appearances as evidence for certain perceptual propositions. 
Hinge  commitments  are  to  be  identified  only  with  ways  of  acting  that  are  constitutive  of  an
assessment ability or, more generally, a cognitive ability. I am interested in abilities that we take for
granted, like those that give us access to reality or provide us a cognitive contact with the world.
Perceptual  discriminatory  abilities  fit  the  bill,  but  I  think  that  abilities  to  assess  evidence  in  a
particular  subject-matter  can also give us  access  to  evidential  relations  and,  therefore,  are  also
instances  of  the  kind  of  ability  I  have  in  mind.  To  fully  account  for  propositional  perceptual
knowledge we need both discriminatory abilities and assessment abilities. Through discriminatory
abilities we keep our access to environmental objects and become acquainted with their appearances
from  particular  positions.  Appearances  here  are  not  subjective  experiences,  they  are  ways  an
environmental  object  presents  itself  to  a  subject.1 Trough  assessment  abilities  we  acquire
propositional perceptual knowledge based on those appearances. Both discriminatory abilities and
assessment abilities are cognitive abilities because they give us access to something when properly
1 For more discussion on an objective treatment of appearances see Noë’s sensorimotor theory of perception (2004, 
Chapter 3).
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exercised. Abilities of this kind have two features that are relevant for the ability reading: (I) they
are reliably successful; and (II) they are manifested only when successful. As to the first feature,
abilities satisfy what Alan Millar called the strong reliability requirement. As he puts, “to count as
having  the  ability  to  Φ  one  must  be  reliably  successful  at  Φing  in  that  in  the  absence  of
impediments one would nearly always Φ if one were to act with the intention of Φing” (Millar
2016, 67). The acquisition of an ability is the outcome of a long process of attunement between
organism and its environment. Ways of acting that constitute, for instance, the ability to Φ  were
selected because they have been shown to be the best ones for achieving Φ. This may also help to
explain why these ways of acting are performed with strong confidence, producing the attitude of
certainty that is normally associated with hinge commitments. 
By identifying hinge commitments with ways of acting of a special sort, the current proposal also
does justice to the idea that hinge commitments should be conceived as “something that lies beyond
being  justified  or  unjustified;  as  it  were,  as  something  animal”  (Wittgenstein  1969,  43).  The
certainty embodied in a hinge commitment is not a kind of propositional attitude but a way of
being-in-the-world, namely, our being-in-the-world as skillful agents. 
Like the nonpropositional reading, the current proposal also predicts that hinge commitments are
not  in  the  market  for  knowledge.  Fundamentally,  they  are  dispositions  or  ways  of  acting  that
constitute abilities. So, it’s inappropriate to attempt to plug them into bridging principles derived
from the closure principle. The closure-based paradox, therefore, does not even get off the ground.
However,  unlike  the  nonpropositional  reading,  the  current  proposal  does  not  claim  that  it’s
impossible to capture hinge commitments in propositions. A way of acting that constitutes an ability
may be expressed in a rule or in a prescription that states how one should act in order to exercise
that ability.  However,  these rule-propositions do not do full  justice to the role played by hinge
commitments,  now conceived  as  ways  of  acting.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  abilities  are  not
reducible to a set of propositions (Ryle 1945-46, 10). To take a familiar example, Hannah may
know that that is a way of riding a bike while at the same time she does not know how to ride a
bike. Know the rules (the ways one should act in certain conditions) that govern a practice is not
enough to be able to perform that practice. Thus, unless these rules are embodied in an ability, they
will  not  produce  the  right  actions,  nor  will  they  structure  a  procedure  of  inquiry  or  rational
evaluation in a way that is ready to be employed. Talking about hinge commitments only in terms of
propositions  is  too intellectualist  and runs the risk of  obscuring the animal  and pre-predicative
dimensions of hinge commitments.
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The ability reading also has the advantage of offering a unified response both to the universality of
rational evaluation thesis and to the insularity of reasons thesis. This is possible because of the
second feature of abilities, namely, that they are manifested only when successful. Let’s see how
this may be further articulated. According to Pritchard, our hinge commitments codify “that one is
not radically and fundamentally mistaken in one’s beliefs” (Pritchard 2015, 95). However, he does
not  explain  why this  would be the case.  According to  the ability  reading,  one  is  not  radically
mistaken in one’s beliefs because of one’s abilities to access reality. One’s abilities are attuned to
one’s  local  environment.  This  has  consequences  for  how we should  conceive  reasons  that  are
accessible to reflection. Reasons for beliefs are grounded on one’s cognitive contact with the world,
a contact  which is  established and sustained by one’s cognitive abilities.  As I  will  argue soon,
reasons that lean on cognitive abilities of this sort are factive. However, because Pritchard does not
construe hinge commitments as ways of acting that constitute abilities, he does not see potential in
the hinge framework to also address the insularity of reasons thesis. In this regard, he says: 
That all rational evaluation is essentially local is entirely compatible, after all,
with it also being “insular” in the manner set out in part 1— namely, such that
the rational support one’s everyday beliefs enjoys is compatible, even in the best
case, with those beliefs being radically in error. (Pritchard 2015, 114)
According to this view, hinge commitments can secure that one is not radically mistaken in one’s
beliefs, but these commitments do not secure that one’s accessible reasons rule out the possibility
that one’s beliefs are false. Hinge commitments, therefore, do not suffice to deny the insularity of
reasons  thesis.  However,  I  submit  that  we  have  a  different  outcome  if  we  think  of  hinge
commitments not as propositional attitudes but as ways of acting. Construed as ways of acting that
constitute  an  ability  that  provides  access  to  reality,  hinge  commitments  also  undermine  the
insularity of reasons thesis. This is because there is no gap between the results of ways of acting and
success  in  achieving the  aim of  the  ability  that  is  constituted  by these  ways of  acting.  If  one
exercises an ability and, therefore, performs the ways of acting that constitute that ability, then one
will succeed in achieving its aim. Alan Millar call this thesis  the success thesis.  As he puts it,
“people exercise the ability to do something only if they do, or are doing, that thing.” (Millar 2016,
p. 63). I subscribe to the notion that this is the right way to think about an ability that provides
cognitive  contact  with  reality.  Anything  short  of  the  success  thesis  does  not  secure  cognitive
contact. In the case of propositional perceptual knowledge, we have first access to objects and their
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appearances  through  discriminatory  abilities  and  then  we  have  access  to  evidential  relations
between  those  appearances  and  certain  perceptual  propositions  through  assessment  abilities.
Because of the success thesis, the evidential relations we have access to are factive. They are the
accessible reasons for our perceptual propositional knowledge. 
One may worry whether the same ways of acting that constitutes an ability could not be performed
or  manifested  in  a  skeptical  scenario.  No,  they  cannot.  Actions  cannot  be  individuated
independently of what they accomplish. You cannot catch a ball if there is no ball to be caught. Your
movements may be similar, but what you are doing is a completely different thing. At best, you are
trying to catch a ball, but this is not the same as catching a ball. Similarly, you cannot take some
documents or pictures as evidence that Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz was in 1805 if there are no
pictures or documents, or if the pictures or documents were forged. Your behavior may be similar,
but what you are doing is not an act of assessing evidence. Disjunctivism is a consequence of the
proposed construal of abilities. Either one exercises one’s ability and achieves its aim, or one has
failed to exercise that ability and, therefore, did not manifest it. When we consider an assessment
ability, the ability to assess evidence of a subject matter, we get disjunctivism about evidence. Either
one exercises one’s ability to assess evidence and therefore has access to the fact that a particular
piece  of  evidence  (or  an  appearance  in  the  case  of  perceptual  knowledge)  favors  a  certain
hypothesis (or a perceptual proposition), or one has failed to exercise that ability and therefore has
access to no evidential relation. 
That cognitive abilities in general are reliably successful secures of course that one is not radically
mistaken in one’s beliefs.  That these abilities are exercised and manifested only when they are
successful secures that accessible reasons based on those successful exercises are not insular. Thus
hinge  commitments,  construed  as  ways  of  acting  that  constitute  abilities  of  access,  provide
resources  to  respond both to  the universality  of  rational  evaluation thesis  and the insularity  of
reasons thesis. The key is to conceive of hinge commitments in the light of what is necessary to
secure cognitive contact with the world.2 The gap is closed between not being radically mistaken in
one’s  beliefs  and having reasons  that  are  compatible  with  these  beliefs  being  false.  The  same
abilities that are responsible for ruling out the possibility of being radically mistaken in one’s beliefs
are also responsible, when properly exercised, for providing reasons that are not compatible with
2 One consequence of this view is that all our propositional knowledge and understanding are ultimately based on
skills, or, to put in Ryle’s words, one “is primarily a knower-how and only secondarily a knower-that” (1945-46, p.
16). See Carvalho (2018) for a more detailed explanation of this point. 
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the falsity of those beliefs. In fact, because our procedures of rational evaluation are local, that is,
attuned to our environment, they are not insular. 
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